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JUDITH E. JACOBSEN*

The Navajo Indian Irrigation
Project and Quantification
of Navajo Winters Rights
ABSTRACT
It has been said that in accepting the Navajo Indian Irrigation
Project (NIIP), the Navajo Tribe quantified its Winters rightsfor all
time. Under the law governing the judicial interpretationof treaties,
Congress has the power to abrogatea treaty right, such as Winters
water rights, but it must manifest a clear and plain intent to do so.
However,NIIP's record does not contain evidence of a clearand plain
congressionalintent to quantify all Navajo Winters rightsfor all
time. Other issues similarly contradict the notion that quantification
occurred. Thus it is not possible to conclude that NIIP constituted
quantificationof Navajo Winters rights.

INTRODUCTION
In 1962, the United States Congress authorized the Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project (NIIP), a 110,630-acre, 508,000 acre-foot irrigation project
located in the northeastern corner of the Navajo Reservation, just south of
Farmington, New Mexico.1 In the course of negotiating NIIP with the federal government and the state of New Mexico, the Navajo Tribe made certain concessions regarding its legal claims to the waters of the San Juan
River under the 1908 United States Supreme Court case, Winters v. United
States.2 It has been claimed by some observers of NIIP that these concessions amount to quantification of Navajo Winters rights, or a limitation for
*Professor Jacobsen is assistant professor in the department of geography and recreation at
the University of Wyoming.
1. Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, 43 U.S.C. §615ii-615zz (1962) (omitted). The language
of the act does not actually appear in the U.S.C. The language is set out in full at Navajo
Indian Irrigation Project, Pub. L. No. 87-483 (§§2-18), 76 Stat. 120 (1962) [hereinafter NIIP
Act]. Citations will be made to sections of the Public Law.
2. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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all time to a specified amount. 3 The purpose of this article is to show that,
based on the legislation and its history, it is not a simple matter to confirm
that quantification took place. Indeed, ambiguities cloud most of the
record on NIIP-ambiguities which the tradition of the trust responsibility and the canons of construction suggest ought to be resolved in favor of
Navajo water rights.4
The Winters decision established Indian rights to waters touching
Indian reservations in any way, reasoning that when Congress created reservations, it implicitly created rights to sufficient water to satisfy the purpose of the reservation.,5 These rights, also called federally reserved water
rights, date from the year Congress created a reservation and exist
whether or not Indians have put the water to beneficial use. A subsequent
case, Arizona v. California,6 established the standard for quantifying Indian
Winters claims. Under Arizona v. California, a tribe is entitled to enough7
water to irrigate all "practicably irrigable acreage on [its] reservation."
Irrigation consumes many times more water than municipal or industrial
(M&I) uses do,8 and Indian reservations are often extensive, giving rise to
3. See, e.g., C. DuMars & H. Ingram, CongressionalQuantificationof Indian Reserved Water
Rights: A Definitive Solution or Mirage?20 Nat. Res. J. 17 (1980) The authors of this article maintain that "the Indian question was supposedly settled on the San Juan" with NIIP, but that
considerable uncertainty remains, id. at 23-24. They present competing arguments on the
issues. For the argument that the Navajo did not quantify their Winters rights with NII, see
id. at 28-29; for the argument that they did, see id. at 35-39. See also M. Price & G. Weatherford,
Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice,118 Law & Contemp. Probs. 97, 119-30 (1976). The
authors write that with the passage of NIIP's authorizing legislation, "[ain unquantified Winters right with all its uncertainties, had been converted to the promise of water works that
could be of use to the Navajo people. Something was surrendered ... in exchange for a promise of substantial federal funds to develop a portion of the Navajo economy that was desperately in need of nourishment." Id. at 124. See also J. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through
IntergovernmentalAgreements: The Prosand Cons of NegotiatedSettlements, in Indian Water 1985:
Collected Essays 25, 32-33 (C. Miklas & S. Shupe eds., 1986) [hereinafter Negotiated Settlements]; D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law: Cases and Materials 702 (1986). None
of these authors specifies the geographic extent of the alleged quantification. In the present
article, mention of the potential quantification of Navajo Winters rights with NIIP always,
unless specified otherwise, refers to Navajo claims to the San Juan in New Mexico only. For
fuller understanding of this point, see infra note 130.
4. For descriptions of the trust responsibility and the canons of construction, see F. Cohen,
Federal Indian Law 220-221 (1982). These concepts and other concepts of federal Indian law
are discussed further in the present article in the section entitled The Law Relevant to Quantification.
5. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
6. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
7. Id. at 600. This case also applied the reasoning in Winters to federal reservations other
than Indian reservations. Thus national forests, wilderness areas, parks, and the like have
federally reserved water rights attached to them. Id. at 601.
8. The main uses of water are agricultural, municipal, and industrial. In the West as a
whole, roughly 90 percent of all water is used for agricultural purposes. See W. Solley et al.,
Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 1985 at 62 (U.S. Geological Survey Circular
1004, 1988). In the Upper Colorado Basin, 95 percent of water is used for irrigation; in the
Lower Colorado Basin, the figure is 84 percent; for the Rio Grande Basin, 89 percent; and for
the Great Basin, 91 percent. Id.
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potentially huge claims. 9 These claims also conflict sharply with prior
appropriation claims
because they exist whether or not a tribe puts water
10

to beneficial use.

The settlement of Winters claims, whether through negotiation or

litigation,11 is a double-edged sword: Indians settling Winters claims make
specific the water rights to which they previously had only inchoate
claims, but they also limit the size of their claims to the specified

amount. 12 Thus they lose or 'waive' any further Winters claims for all time,
if the quantification is legally binding.
The simultaneous loss and gain involved in settling Winters
claims for all time is illustrated by the quantities of water that appeared to
be at stake when NIIP was under discussion. 13 The Navajo Reservation

touches the San Juan River from just downstream of Farmington, New
Mexico, to the river's confluence with the mainstream of the Colorado
River, now Lake Powell. When NIIP was under serious discussion, in the
1950s and early 1960s, 45 years of annual flow records on the San Juan
existed for two locations. At the site of Navajo Dam, 14 the average annual
flow as of 1960 was approximately 1 million acre-feet. At Bluff, Utah, 150
9. The original PIA award, given to the Indians of the Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River, and Fort Mohave Reservations was approximately I million acre-feet per year,
a significant portion of the entire Colorado River's flow. See Arizona v. California, 363 U.S. at
595-96, 600. The PIA standard also produced an award of an estimated 500,717 acre-feet per
year, in In Re The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in The Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 100-11 (Wyo. 1988), aff'd Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989)
[hereinafter The Wind River Adjudication]. This award of 500,717 acre-feet annually amounts
to just under half of the flow of the river. While numerous acreage and water allotments are
discussed in the Wind River Adjudication, no exact total is given. However, it is regularly
reported in the Wyoming press that the award was 500,717 acre-feet per year, out of a total
river flow of 1.2 to 1.5 million acre-feet. See, e.g., K. Collins, Tribes Ask Court to OrderRegulation, Casper Star-Tribune, July 31, 1990, at Al, col. 5. It has been estimated that unadjudicated
claims by Indians could exceed by many times the average annual flows of several of the
West's major rivers, including the Klamath, Colorado, Flathead, Salmon, San Juan, and Yuba
Rivers. See Western States Water Council, Indian Water Rights in the West 9 (1984) (study prepared for the Western Govenors' Ass'n).
10. D. Getches, Water Law 79-80 (1984).
11. See, e.g., American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc., American Indian Resources
Institute, Tribal Water Management Handbook 17 (1987); Cohen, supra note 4, at 599.
12. In this sense, the quantification of Winters rights is very much like an Indian agreement
to relinquish rights to all the land and resources that they once used and to live on a small
portion of that former claim-namely, a reservation. For this reason, quantification of Winters
claims is parallel to treaties creating reservations. Further, both involve important Indian
rights (without water, grants of land in the arid West are meaningless), a part of which Indians relinquish and a part of which they keep.
13. It is said that the quantities of water appeared to be at stake because the precise basis of
Navajo claims was not fully known prior to the 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,supra
note 6. Thus the figures are offered in this paragraph for illustrative purposes only.
14. Navajo Dam, authorized by the Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§620,
620a-o (1956), stores water in Navajo Reservoir, some of which is diverted for use on the
Navajo Irrigation Project. It was built between 1958 and 1962. For further information on
Navajo Dam, see Bureau of Reclamation, Dep't of Interior, Navajo Dam and Reservoir: Technical Record of Design and Construction 1 (1966).
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miles downstream, the figure was 2 million acre-feet. 15 The Navajo could
16
claim rights to all of this flow, and did so early in the NIIP negotiations.
NIIP's authorizing legislation specifies a diversion for the completed
project of 508,000 acre-feet per year. 17 Testimony on the project discussed
an annual consumptive use of approximately 250,000 acre-feet. 18 Assuming a total potential claim of 2 million acre-feet, quantification of 250,000
acre-feet would entail the relinquishment of claims to 1.75 million acrefeet per year. Assuming a smaller potential claim of 1 million acre-feet and
quantification at the larger diversion figure of 508,000 acre-feet, the lost or
waived claims amount to approximately 500,000 acre-feet per year. These
are substantial amounts of water, and therefore substantial potential
losses in the arid West.
The political context of Indian water settlements gives rise to
another feature of quantification. Often a defacto bargain appears to exist
between Congress and a tribe: federal assistance for water works or economic development in general comes as compensation to a tribe for its

15. San Juan-Chama Reclamation Projectand Navajo Indian IrrigationProject: Hearingson H.R.
2552, H.R. 6541, and S. 107 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Committee on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1961) [hereinafter House Hearing
1961]. The Animas River, a large, south-flowing tributary to the San Juan, contributes much
of the difference between the 1.0 and 2.0 million acre feet. Its average annual flow as of 1960
was believed to be 617,000 acre-feet, id.
16. All the NIJP negotiations and consideration in Congress occurred prior to the practicably irrigable acreage standard for quantification established by the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. Californiain 1963. Thus the negotiators did not have firm authority for the size of a Navajo
claim. Only the Navajo made statements about having claims on the entire San Juan River.
See Stenographic Transcript of Proceedings Before the U.S. Dep't of the Interior in the Matter
of the San Juan-Chama Conference, March 27-28,1951 (on file with the Office of the Secretary
of the Interior in Box 3642 of the Central Classified Files, 1937-1953, Record Group 48, File
Number 8-8) [hereinafter Stenographic Transcripts]After 1963, in addition to having priority,
potential Navajo claims became enormous. The Navajo reservation is 15 million acres, and if
only a small portion of it were deemed practicably irrigable, the claim on San Juan water easily reaches the entire flow. See, e.g., D. Getches & C. Meyers, The River of Controversy: Persistent
Issues, in New Courses for the Colorado River: Major Issues for the Next Century 51 (G.
Weatherford & F. Brown eds., 1986); W. Back & J.Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pullingthe Plug
on the Colorado River? 20 Nat. Res. J. 71 (1980).
17. NIIP Act, supra note 1, at §2.
18. The 1957 Supplement to the 1955 Feasibility Report prepared by the BIA on NIIP actually mentioned 281,800 acre-feet of consumptive use for a completed project. H.R. Doc. No.
424,86th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1960). The Feasibility Report itself skirted the issue of total consumptive use for the project. See id. at 324-328. Early BIA testimony echoed the 281,000 acrefoot figure. Navajo Irrigation-SanJuan-ChamaDiversion: Hearings on S. 3648 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1958) [hereinafter Senate Hearing 1958]. In later years, the figure became
252,300 acre-feet. See Navajo Irrigation-SanJuan-Chama Diversion, New Mexico: Hearingon S.
72 before the Subcomm. on Irrigationand Reclamation of the Senate Comm. on Interiorand Insular
Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959) [hereinafter Senate Hearing1959]; Navajo Indian Irrigation Project and San Juan-ChamaProject:Hearingon S. 107 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigationand
Reclamation of the Senate Committee on InteriorandInsular Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1961)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing1961].
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agreement to give up some
portion of its Winters claim and limit itself to
19

the quantified amount.
Indians also can compromise, waive, or otherwise relinquish the
priority, as distinguished from the quantity, of their Winters claims. Under
the doctrine of prior appropriation, when water is scarce, priority controls
the size of the claim. Thus, if Indians consent to the validity of existing
nonIndian claims on a stream, and if, with the Indian claims, the river is
fully allocated, giving up the priority of a' Winters claim amounts to the
same thing as limiting the quantity. But if a stream is not fully allocated, or
if the allocations violate valid Indian claims, a tribe could waive its Winters
priority to a particular amount of water without limiting its total claim for
all time to that amount.
Judicial quantifications of Indian Winters claims have occurred in
only a few cases. Arizona v. Californiaquantified the water rights of the
Colorado River tribes at 1 million acre-feet per year.20 In 1989, the Winters
claims of the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho tribes on the Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming were quantified at approximately 500,000 acrefeet per year.21 Currently 50 cases are pending that would quantify Indian
Winters claims. 22 Litigation is so costly that significant pressure exists to
negotiate settlements of Indian Winters rights. For instance, the Wyoming
litigation has cost that state alone nearly $10 million.23 It is widely agreed
that as of 1991 Indian claims have been legitimately quantified in five settlements. Each settlement has subsequently been ratified by or embodied
in federal legislation. Those settlements involve the Ak-Chin Indians,
some members of the Papago, and the Salt River Pima-Maricopa, all of
Arizona, the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute of Colorado, and several
24
bands of Mission Indians in Southern California.
19. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 598. See also Price & Weatherford, supra note 3, at 100,

124.
20. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 596,600.
21. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
22. See J.Echohawk, Sources of Water IV. Tribal Water Rights, in Moving the West's Water
to New Uses: Winners and Losers (1990).
23. See A. MacKinnon, Big Horn Water Adjudication Still Not Complete After Twelve Years,
Casper Star-Tribune, Jan. 8,1990, Al, col. 1.

24. The Ak-Chin water rights settlement is at Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978),
amended at Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (1984); the Papago settlement is at Pub. L. No.
97-293,96 Stat. 1274 (1982). The Salt River-Pima Maricopa quantification is at Pub. L. No. 100512,102 Stat. 2549 (1988). For the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute settlements, see Pub.
L. No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973 (1988). For the Mission Indians settlement, see Pub. L. No. 100675, 102 Stat. 4000 (1988). The Winters claims of the Assiniboine and Sioux tribes of the Fort
Peck Reservation in Montana have also been quantified, through an innovative state negotiation procedure. See S. 467, 49th Leg., 1985 Mont. Laws, ch. 735. For commentary on this
approach, see Thorson, supra note 3, at 37-41. Also, it has been debated whether the water
rights of the Ute Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Utah have been quantified.
For the issues involved, see Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 701-2; Thorson, supra note
3, at 34. There are also 14 separate negotiations in progress to settle Indian Winters claims and
six other negotiations may be possible in the future. See Echohawk, supra note 22.
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Some commentators have included Navajo-New Mexico negotiations and the subsequent authorization of NIIP in the set of quantifications
or have otherwise suggested that NIIP involved the quantification of Winters rights.25 The purpose of this article is to show how difficult it is to conclude decisively that quantification did occur. Ambiguities shroud the
record, from the authorizing legislation through House and Senate
Reports to hearing transcripts. This article will analyze that record, against
the backdrop of federal Indian law relevant to quantification.
Whether Navajo claims to the San Juan River in New Mexico were
quantified with the passage of NIIP's authorizing legislation is an important question. With 165,000 members and a reservation of 15 million acres,
the Navajo Tribe has one*of the largest potential Winters claims in the
West.2 6 Also, the issue is not an academic one. Plans for building the Animas-La Plata Project in southwestern Colorado 27 have been interrupted
because the expected consumptive use of the Animas River involved in
that project would reduce flows on the San Juan River below Navajo Dam
and jeopardize the survival of two endangered fish species: the Colorado
squawfish and razorback sucker. An interim plan for saving the fish
involves releases from Navajo Dam of water that may belong to the
Navajo Tribe-if they did not quantify their Winters rights for all time to
the San Juan when they agreed to NIIP. 28 Navajo water rights are also
involved in a general stream adjudication on the San Juan filed by the
New Mexico State Engineer in 1975. At issue in the case are the claims of
the Navajo, the Jicarilla Apache, and Ute Mountain Ute. Also, at issue are
water claims for other federal land. Finally, and most significantly, is the
up water rights in exchange
issue of whether the Navajo Tribe has 2given
9
for federal projects-specifically, NIP.
Understanding whether Navajo claims to the San Juan in New
Mexico were quantified with NIIP requires a brief look at the history of the
project.

25. See articles cited supra note 3. Significantly, in his 1990 review of Indian water rights settlements, John Echohawk, Executive Director of the Native American Rights Fund, does not
include the Navajo or NIIP. See Echohawk, supra note 22.
26. For Navajo population and the Navajo Reservation's area, see Getches & Wilkinson,
supranote 3 at 4, 6. For the size of Navajo Winters claims, see Back & Taylor, supra note 16, at

71.
27. Water and Power Resources Services, Dep't of the Interior, Project Data Book 1981 at
1-4(1981).
28. Memorandum of Understanding, July 1, 1991 (draft) (unpublished manuscript); Preliminary Review Draft, San Juan River Recovery Implementation Program, March 26, 1992
(unpublished manuscript).
29. See J. Whiteing, Survey of Recent Developments in Indian Water Law: Litigation and Negotiations, in Natural Resource Development in Indian Country (1988).
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HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO INDIAN IRRIGATION PROJECT
The 1962 legislation that authorized NIIP followed a decade and a
half of negotiations among the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the state of New Mexico, and the Navajo Tribe to divide the
waters of the San Juan River.30 The state of New Mexico is entitled to a
portion of the San Juan under the set of interstate compacts that govern
allocation of the river's water.31 During negotiations, the debate centered
on the division of San Juan water among the two major river basins in
New Mexico-the San Juan, the source of the water, and the Rio Grande,
the state's most populous area.
Drought and erosion on the Navajo range in the 1930s spurred
Navajo interest in a large irrigation project for the reservation. 32 At the
same time, the state of New Mexico had long been interested in diverting
San Juan water to the more densely populated Rio Grande Valley, by way
of the Rio Chama. 33 By the end of World War II, both basins wanted to
plans to develop the Colobenefit from ambitious Bureau of Reclamation
34
rado River Basin, including the San Juan.
The Winters decision gave the Navajo an important bargaining
chip in the negotiations. The Navajo reservation was created by treaty in
1868, before nonIndian settlement in the basin. 35 Thus Navajo Winters
rights had senior priority over nonIndian prior appropriation claims in
the basin. This priority provided the ground from which the Navajo bargained for an irrigation project for themselves and against a diversion to
the Rio Grande. In 1957, the conflicting basins reached a compromise by
agreeing to two projects-NIIP for the Navajo and, for the Rio Grande, a
project called the San Juan-Chama Diversion. 3 6 The Navajo Irrigation
Project was, once completed, to divert 508,000 acre-feet of water annually
to irrigate 110,630 acres of land. Water was to be stored behind Navajo
Dam and would move through a total of 450 miles of canals, tunnels,
30. See J.Jacobsen, A Promise Made: The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project and Water Politics in the American West 109-33 (1989) (recounting the history of this negotiation).
31. For a discussion of the "law of the Colorado River" see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
32. See D. Parman, The Navajos and the New Deal 150 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Nat'l Resources Committee, 1 Regional Planning, Part VI: The Rio Grande,
Joint Investigation in the Upper Rio Grande Basin in Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas 19361937 at 475 (1938) (discussing a diversion from the San Juan to the Rio Grande).
34. See J. Krug, The Colorado River: A Comprehensive Report on the Development of the
Water Resources of the Colorado River Basin for Irrigation, Power Production, and Other
Beneficial Uses in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming
(1946) (discussing Bureau of Reclamation plans to develop the Colorado Basin, including the

San Juan Basin).
35. Treaty between the U.S. and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, June 1,1868, United StatesNavajo Tribe, 15 Stat. 667-72 (1869).
36. See H. Doc. No. 424, supra note 18, at xxix; Navajo Tribal Advisory Council Resolution
ACJ-1-57 (unpublished manuscript) (available at the Navajo Nation Dep't of Justice Law
Library, in Window Rock, Az.) [hereinafter Advisory Council Resolution ACJ-I-57].
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siphons, and underground pipes in the course of irrigating project lands.
NIIP was to be completed fourteen years after authorization. 3 7 The
Chama Project was to divert 110,000 acre-feet annually through three tunnels from the Rio Blanco, Little Navajo, and Navajo Rivers, tributaries of
the San Juan, to Rio Chama, a tributary of the Rio Grande. To be completed in five years, the diversion's
waters were to be used for municipal
38
and industrial purposes.
In the course of reaching agreement on the two projects, the
Navajo Tribe compromised or waived certain Winters claims to San Juan
waters. One can be certain about the waiver of some of the claims. First,
the tribe agreed to allow 110,000 acre-feet of San Juan water to which they
had Winters claims to be diverted to the Rio Grande Basin annually. In
1951, at the first negotiating session in which Navajo officials participated,
Tribal Council Chair Sam Akheah insisted that the tribe had Winters
claims to the entire river. "[Tihe Navajos feel the San Juan is their river,"
he said, pointing out that the Tribe had large enough needs and had been
promised enough economic development by the federal government that
they could easily use all the river's water. Ahkeah concluded, "there are
no tenable grounds for the proposed [Chama] diversion, and [we] urge
you to support firmly what we regard as our moral
and legal right to the
39
fullest possible development of the San Juan."
However, by 1957 the tribe had decided to relinquish its claims to
the 110,000 acre-feet for the Diversion. The reasons for this choice are
plain. In the 1957 resolution that urged Congress to pass a bill jointly
authorizing NIIP and the San Juan-Chama Diversion, the Tribal Council
acknowledged that it was supporting the Chama Diversion "[iun return
for the generous support of the State of New Mexico for the proposed
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project." 40 Navajo accession to the Chama Diversion is a classic example of the political dynamic in which Indian water
claims exist. In exchange for political support of NIIP, the tribe gave up
110,000 acre-feet of water a year.
The Navajo also waived their early priority to the water to be used
in NIIP in the course of negotiating for the project. That is, instead of
insisting on their right to receive all their NIP water first in times of shortage, which they could do under Winters, they agreed to share any short
supply ratably with other users. 41 Section 11(a) of the 1962 authorizing
37. H. Doc. 424, supranote 18, at 274-78; B. Boman, Consumptive Use on the Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project 3-4 (1983).
38. H. Doc. No. 424, supra note 18, at 343.
39. Stenographic Transcripts, supra note 16, at 57-62.
40. Navajo Tribal Council Resolution CD-86-57 (available in the Law Library of the Navajo
Nation Department of Justice in Window Rock, Arizona.) [hereinafter Council Resolution CD86-571.
41. See Navajo Tribal Council Minutes for Tribal Council decision to share shortages at 6768 (Dec. 11, 1957) (on file with the Tribal Chairman's Office at the Records and Communications Dep't of the Navajo Nation, in Window Rock, Az.) [hereinafterMinutes of Dec. 11,1957].
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legislation requires all users of water under the legislation, including the
Navajo Tribe, to have contracts with the Secretary of Interior which
include a provision calling for ratable sharing of supplies in time of shortage.42 The contract signed bfy the Tribe in 1976 pursuant to the legislation
contains such a provision.4 The Tribal Council clearly intended to share
shortages: in discussion of the 1957 draft NIIP bill, attorney Larry Davis
explained at length that a Navajo agreement to share shortages would
mean the loss of the priority that Winters 44
otherwise gave them. The Counanyway.
provision
the
accept
to
voted
cil
But does the agreement to share shortages quantify Navajo Winters rights?45 There are four areas which must be discussed before this
question can be answered: existing Indian law relevant to quantification of
Winters rights; provisions of NIIP's authorizing legislation that may be
read to affect Indian water claims (the shortage-sharing provision and section 12(a)); the law governing allocation of water within the Colorado
River Basin; and the legislative record on NIIE Each of these topics will be
addressed in the following discussion.

THE LAW RELEVANT TO QUANTIFICATION
The law explicitly on quantification of Indian Winters rights is
scanty.4 6 It is not possible to construct a line of case law from Winters to
contemporary cases of Winters rights quantification. Thus one must turn
for guidance to the larger body of Indian law. The portion of Indian law
relevant to quantification of Winters rights-which are property rights created by judicial interpretation of treaties-is the law relating to the power
42. NIIP Act, supra note 1, §11(a). The shortage-sharing provision was part of the earliest
draft bill agreed to by the Navajo Tribe and the state of New Mexico. See Council Resolution
CD-86-57, supranote 40, at 3. The provision was also part of every NIIP-San Juan-Chama bill
introduced. See Senate Hearing 1958, supranote 18, at 3-5; Senate Hearing 1959, supranote
18, at 3-6; San Juan-ChamaReclamation Projectand Navajo Indian IrrigationProject: Hearingon
H.R. 2352, H.R. 2494, and S. 72 before the Subcomm. on Irrigationand Reclamation of the House
Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1960) [hereinafter House Hearing
1960]; Senate Hearing 1961, supra note 18, at 1-5; House Hearing 1961, supra note 15, at 1-9
(1961).
43. Contract between the Navajo Tribe and the Dep't of the Interior, 1976, No. 14-06-W-269.
44. Minutes of Dec. 11, 1957, supra note 41, at 67-68. Davis said, "If this section were not in
there and the Bill were to become law, your Navajo Irrigation Project would have first priority
to those waters. You would not have shortages. Everybody else would." Id. The shortagesharing provision is discussed further infra in the section entitled Sharing Shortages.
45. Writers concluding that NIIP quantified Navajo Winters claims do so on the basis of the
shortage-sharing provision. See articles cited supra note 3.
46. There is no case law squarely on the question of how Indians can quantify their otherwise inchoate Winters rights to water. The only case that explicitly addresses Indian water
rights other than Winters and Arizona v. California is Wyoming v. United States, supra note 9.
That one-sentence, 4-4 opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court affirms The Wind River Adjudication,
supra note 9, an award by the Supreme Court of Wyoming to the tribes of the Wind River Reservation based on PIA. See also Echohawk, supra note 22.
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of Congress over Indians and their property. This body of law starts with
the tension between the power of Congress over Indian affairs and the
special obligations
owed Indians by Congress that constrain the exercise
47
of that power.
The power of the federal government over Indian affairs is usually described as 'plenary,' meaning full or complete.48 That power is so
great that it even allows Congress to abrogate a treaty obligation against
the will of the Indians involved.4 9 Thus Congress could, other things
being equal, quantify a tribe's Winters rights without that tribe's consent.
But the power of Congress over Indians, though full and complete, is not
absolute. In United States v. Dion,50 the Supreme Court held that for Congress to abrogate a treaty provision, its intent to do so must be "clear and
plain." 5 1 The Court went on to specify that "what is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended
action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty."52 In so holding, the Court
did not require an "express declaration," or explicit statutory language, to

find intent, instead allowing
reliance on "clear and reliable evidence in the
53
history."
legislative
That Congress must clearly and plainly intend to do something
that compromises Indian property rights derives from what has been
called "one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law," the trust responsibility.54 The roots of the trust responsibility lie in Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,55 in which Marshall called
Indian tribes "domestic dependent nations... in a state of pupilage [to the

United States]." 56 He went on to say specifically that their "relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 5 7 Thus the federal
47. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 207. The federal government is the source of authority over
Indians, not the states. See C. Wilkinson, Indians, lime, and the Law 24 (1987) (citing Johnson
v. M'ntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1932). See also Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 3, at
161.
48. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1885) (usually cited as the primary source of
the plenary power doctrine). See also Cohen, supra note 4, at 207-12.
49. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,556 (1903) ("The power exists to abrogate the
provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when
circumstances arise which will not only justify the government disregarding the stipulations
of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves that
it should do so.")
50. 476 U.S. 734 (1985).
51. Id. at 738.
52. Id. at 739-40. See also C. Wilkinson & J. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian TreatyAbrogation: "As Long as Water Flows,or GrassGrows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is That? 63 Cal.
L. Rev. 601, 627-30, 645-59 (1975).
53. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739 (citing Cohen, supra note 4, at 223).
54. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 221.
55. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. See also Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 52, at 612-17.
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government owes Indian tribes a dut to act as a fiduciary or trustee-in
their best interests and in good faith.58
Since 1831, in the course of applying the principles of trust and
fiduciary duty set out in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,the Supreme Court has
developed an important procedural limit on congressional power over
Indian affairs. That limit is embodied in the "canons of construction,"
which derive from the principle that "federal action toward Indians as
expressed in treaties, agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative regulations is construed in light of the trust responsibility." 59 The
specific canons include the following closely related ideas: language is
construed liberally when the creation of Indian rights is at issue; language
that might compromise Indian rights should be construed strictly; and
to favor Indians and
where ambiguities exist, language will be construed
60
as the Indians involved would have understood it.
It is possible to summarize the law pertaining to quantification of
Indian Winters rights and apply it to the Navajo case regarding San Juan
waters and the Navajo Irrigation Project in the following way: It is within
the power of Congress to quantify Navajo Winters rights, even contrary to
the wishes of the Navajo Tribe. For NIIP's authorization to have achieved
this, however, the language of the statute or "clear and reliable evidence in
the legislative history" must express the clear and plain intent of Congress
to quantify Navajo Winters rights with NIIP for all time. Under the standard set by United States v. Dion, the record needs to show that Congress
"actually considered the conflict" between allowing the Navajo the full
scope of their Winters rights (treaty rights) and limiting those rights to the
NIIP allocation. Under the canons of construction, language limiting
Navajo water rights must be read strictly, while language creating or preserving Navajo water rights must be construed liberally. Ambiguities in
the statute (or the record) must be read to favor Navajo interests (the preservation of Winters rights or compensation for lost rights) and as the
Navajo would have understood the language at the time.

58. In Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), the Supreme Court spoke of

"the obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people." Id. at 296, The Court wrote, "In carrying out its treaty
obligations with the Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in many acts
of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who
represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting
fiduciary standards." Id. at 296-97.
59. Cohen, supra note 4, at 220-21. See also Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 52, at 617-18.
60. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 221-22,224-25. See also Getches & Wilkinson, supranote 3,
at 217.
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SECTION 12(A) AND "THE LAW OF THE RIVER"
The power to quantify Indian Winters rights lies with Congress.
The source of congressional action on the issue is legislative materialsNIIP's authorizing statute and, in the event of ambiguities, the legislative
history. In the authorizing legislation itself, the only language that explicitly mentions Indian water rights is section 12(a). It provides:
None of the project works or structures authorized by
this Act shall be so operated as to create, implement, or
satisfy any preferential right in the United States or
any Indian tribe to the waters impounded, diverted, or
used by means of such project works or structures,
other than contained in those rights to the uses of
water granted to the States of New Mexico and Arizona pursuant to the provisions of the Upper Colorado
River Basin compact.!
This statement means that use of project canals and other conduits to satisfy a Winters right (a 'preferential right') can occur only if the
amount delivered does not exceed the amount allocated to New Mexico
and to Arizona under the 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.
Understanding this statement fully requires a digression on what is traditionally called 'the law of the Colorado River.'
Two interstate compacts form the foundation of that law. The first
is the Colorado River Compact of 1922; the second, the Upper Colorado
River Basin Compact of 1948.62 The 1922 Compact divides the basin into
an upper and lower part (the point of division is Lee Ferry in northern Arizona) and allocates part of the river's waters to each basin. The negotiators based the allocation on the belief that the average annual flow of the
river at Lee Ferry was more than 16 million acre-feet and allocated something less than half that, 7.5 million acre-feet, to each basin. The apportionment took the form of a promise by the states above Lee Ferry (Wyoming,
Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico) "not to deplete the Lee Ferry flow
for any 10 consecutive years." 63
below an aggregate of 75 million acre-feet
64
The upper basin was to get the balance.
61. NIIP Act, supra note 1, at §12(a).
62. The language used in the Colorado River Compact can be found at 70 Cong. Rec. 32425 (1928). Congress consented to the Compact in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, §13,
45 Stat. 1064 (Dec. 21,1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §617 (1)(1982)). The language of the Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact can be found at 95 Cong. Rec. 2758-2762 (1949). Congress
consented to the Compact in the Act of April 6, 1949, 63 Stat. 31 (uncodified). For the history
of development of the law of the Colorado River, see N. Hundley, The West Against Itself. The
Colorado River-An InstitutionalHistory,in New Courses for the Colorado River, supranote 16,
at9.
63. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 558.
64. See Colorado River Compact, supra note 62, at art. II (division at Lee Ferry into two
basins); art. III(a) (allocation of 7.5 million acre-feet to each basin); art. II(d) (delivery by upper
to lower basin, 10-year periods). In 1945, Congress ratified a treaty between the United States
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In 1948 the upper basin states apportioned their share of the Colorado by percentages. Colorado was entitled to 51.75 percent of the upper
basin's share of Colorado water in any given year, Utah, 23 percent, Wyoming, 14 percent, and New Mexico, 11.25 percent. In addition, Arizona, a
of which is located in the upper basin, received 50,000 acresmall portion
65
feet a year.
As it happens, the estimate of average annual flow of the Colorado on which the 1922 Compact was based--over 16 million acre-feetwas high. In fact, analysis of several centuries of tree rings shows the longterm flow to be closer to 13.5 million acre-feet a year.6 5 Because the 1922
Compact promises 7.5 million acre-feet per year to the lower basin, with
the upper basin taking the remainder, a lower annual flow means that
upper basin supplies are considerably smaller than expected under the
1922 Compact.67
All the states of the Colorado basin have traditionally felt that

they need all of their compact allocation for state water rights, or prior
appropriation rights. This is especially so of the upper basin in light of the

lower than expected flow. Federally reserved water rights such as Indian
claims are therefore an enormous threat to the states. Downstream states

are especially fearful lest an upstream state exceed its compact entitlement
in the course of serving an Indian claim with what is, in the view of the
downstream state, downstream water. Colorado was in just such a posi-

tion with regard to New Mexico's use of San Juan water for NIIP.
Section 12(a) of NIIP's authorizing legislation is Colorado's
attempt to keep New Mexico's satisfaction of Winters claims within comand Mexico which was negotiated in 1944 and allocated to Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of the
Colorado River. Treaty between the United States and Mexico, Relating to Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3,1944, U.S.-Mexico. SeealsoN. Hundley,
Dividing the Waters: A Century of Conflict Between the United States and Mexico (1966).
65. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, supra note 62, at art. I1I(a)(1)-(2).
66. See C. Stockton & G. Jacoby, Long-Term Surface-WaterSupply and Streamflow Trends in the
Upper Colorado River Basin (Nat'l Sci. Found., Lake Powell Research Project Bull. No. 18,
March 1976).
67. For an example of the extent to which the lower flow at Lee Ferry, as estimated in 1922,
diminishes upper basin state entitlements, consider the case of New Mexico. In 1958, New
Mexico State Engineer Reynolds estimated that New Mexico's annual compact entitlement
was 838,000 acre-feet. This figure is based on 11.25 percent (the 1948 Compact apportionment
to New Mexico) applied to the net of 7.5 million acre-feet (the 1922 Compact allocation if the
Colorado actually averaged something over 15 million acre-feet a year at Lee Ferry). Subtracted from this figure was 50,000 acre-feet (the 1948 Compact's allotment to Arizona). Senate
Hearing1958, supra note 18, at 86. This ignores treaty obligations to Mexico. By 1975, Reynolds
had revised his estimate to 727,000 acre-feet, based on an average flow of 14 million acre-feet,
though again ignoring treaty obligations to Mexico. San Juan-ChamaProject: Hearingson the
Existing San Juan-ChamaConversion Project in Colorado and the State of New Mexico, and the
Effects of the Project on the Fish and Wildlife Inhabitantsof the San Juan River Basin before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and Water Resources of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1975). If the starting point of upper basin entitlement is 4.5
million acre-feet-based on an annual flow of 13.5 million acre-feet-then New Mexico's entitlement, taking treaty obligations to Mexico and Arizona's allotment into account, is just over
500,000 acre-feet, 60% of Reynolds's original claim.
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pact entitlements. The provision that became section 12(a) first appeared
in 1961.68 Felix Sparks, Director of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board, first proposed the provision in 1960 in negotiations with New Mexico. 69 The 1961 House Report on NIIP states straightforwardly, but succinctly, that the section was necessary to allay the concern of Colorado that
under certain doctrines, particularly those pertaining to irrigation of
Indian lands, the allocations of water to that state under interstate compacts may be jeopardized. It [section 12(a)] would preclude the United
States from furnishing any water through the project works other than
water allocated to the states70of New Mexico or Arizona by the Upper Colorado River Basin compact.
Colorado feared that 'various federal theories,' meaning the Winters doctrine, would allow New Mexico to draw more water from the San
Juan River than the interstate compacts allow under the guise of meeting
Indian water claims. If New Mexico were to exceed its compact allocation,
Colorado feared that, under the 1922 Compact, it would be called on to
release to the lower basin water that it wished 71to use for its reclamation
project in the area, the Animas-La Plata Project.
In House testimony in 1961, Felix Sparks said that as far as Colorado was concerned, all of the waters allocated to New Mexico or Arizona
under the compacts could be used for Indians or other federal uses "but
to the
...that the Federal Government [could not] claim waters allocated
72
State of Colorado for use in either New Mexico or Arizona."
Thus section 12(a) protects Colorado's rights under the interstate
compacts by placing a ceiling on Indian water claims in New Mexico.
While it attempts to limit Indian claims in general, it does not specifically
limit Navajo claims to the NIIP allocation. To do so, the section would
have to mention a specific amount of water and name the Navajo. As it
stands, it does neither. Given the ambiguity surrounding section 12(a), the
canons of construction suggest that it should not be read as a limitation on
Navajo rights.
The ambiguity also makes it necessary to delve deeper into the
legislative record for further explication of the section. In the hearings, for
example, lie some statements that specifically mention limiting Indian
68. Senate Hearing 1961, supra note 18.
69. House Hearing 1960, supra note 42, at 96, 110 (remark of S. Reynolds, State Engineer,
New Mexico.)
70. H.R. Rep. No. 685, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1961), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1681,
1693. Under federal reclamation law, the federal government, in the person of the Secretary
of Interior, actually allocates federal project water, by contract. Thus the mention of the
United States furnishing water in the House Report.
71. See, e.g., Senate Hearing 1959, supranote 18, at 10; House Hearing 1960, supra note 42,
at 96-121, 160-69; House Hearing 1961, supra note 15, at 117-18, 131-32, 141-43, 175-79, 19093, 202-6 (providing discussions concerning the water supply available for the Animas-La
Plata Project). See also Water and Power Resources Service, supra note 27, at 1-4 (describing
the Animas-La Plata Project).
72. House Hearing 1961, supra note 15, at 192.
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claims and appear to suggest that section 12(a) was indeed intended, at
least by some, to limit Navajo rights. The starkest statement supporting
quantification is in the testimony of New Mexico State Engineer Stephen
Reynolds before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation
in 1961. In a section-by-section explanation of the bill under discussion, he
said of section 8, which became section 12(a):
Section 8 of the draft was inserted to give Colorado
assurance that all uses from these projects in New
Mexico or Arizona will be chargeable to the allocations
given New Mexico and Arizona by the Upper Colorado River Basin compact, and that the right to use
amounts in excess of those allocations will not be claimed
under the Winters doctrine3 the 'reservationtheory' or some
other theory of water law.7
Equally suggestive of legislative intent to limit Navajo rights is an
interchange between Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado, chair of
the full Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs while NIIP was under
discussion, and then-Governor of New Mexico Ed Mecham in House
hearings held in 1961. Mecham agreed with Aspinall's statement that
"Indian rights as such in New Mexico will be limited
to the amount of
74
water provided for in the Navajo part of the project."
But do these statements amount to congressional intent to quantify Navajo Winters claims? First, they are contradictory on the size of
Indian claims and ambiguous on the geographical extent of the limitation.
Reynolds's statement suggests, as section 12(a) does, that Winters claims
under the two projects (NIIP and San Juan-Chama) are limited to New
Mexico's and Arizona's entitlements, which, under contemporary estimates, exceeded the allocation for NIIP alone. Aspinall's statement, to
which Mecham assented, limits the Indian claim to NIIP's allocation. But
it implies, as does Reynolds's 1961 statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, that all Indian claims in New Mexico are folded into NIIP. This ignores the potential claims of the Jicarilla
Apache, east and north of the Navajo Reservation but touching tributaries
73. Senate Hearing 1961, supra note 18, at 32 (emphasis added). A similar interchange
occurred in 1970 between Reynolds and Colorado Representative Wayne Aspinall in hearings on bills to amend the NIIP legislation to change the project's boundaries and increase its
appropriation ceiling. Aspinall asked Reynolds, "Before the San Juan-Chama Navajo project
was authorized, the State of New Mexico received from the Navajo Indian Tribe a disclaimer
to any use of further amounts of water other than these, isn't that correct?" Reynolds agreed
that the "disclaimer [was] still in existence," and that New Mexico considered the disclaimer
"a binding contract between the State of New Mexico and the Navajo Indian Tribe controlling
the States [sic] right to use of water from the Colorado River." Navajo Indian IrrigationProject:
Hearing on S.203 and H.R. 13011 Before the Subcommittee on Irrigationand Reclamation of the
House Committee on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1970) [hereinafter House
Hearing1970].
74. House Hearing 1961, supranote 15, at 21-22.
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75
to the San Juan, as well as the many Pueblo tribes along the Rio Grande.
Surely it is not possible to quantify the Winters claims of tribes who were
absent from the negotiation and never mentioned by any party. Thus, as
clear as these statements are in their reference to limitation of Indian water
claims, it is hard to conclude that they limit Navajo Winters claims to the
NIIP allocation.
Another difficulty with the statements is their status as expressions of individual state views, rather than federal views. Is it possible to
take as an expression of congressional intent, meaning the intent of congress as a whole, the view of state-level representatives of New Mexico,
which both Reynolds and Mecham were? United States Rep. Aspinali put
the words in Mecham's mouth. But it can be argued that he was acting
more as a representative of Colorado, whose interests he was protecting to
the sharp exclusion of concern for Navajo interests, than he was acting as
a federal legislator. Aspinall's position relative to the Navajo exemplifies a
fundamental dynamic in Indian affairs-that of state antagonism to
Indian interests. Taking Aspinall's state-oriented view as congressional
intent also contradicts a fundamental principle in Indian law that the federal government is the site of authority over Indians. 76 Calling Aspinall's
statement the intent of Congress masquerades as federal interests what
are truly state interests. Hearing records contain many things that do not
constitute congressional intent; it is entirely possible that these two state77
ments are examples of remarks that must "be used with discrimination."
These two less than fully clear and consistent statements represent the entire legislative record on section 12(a) that uses express language of limiting Indian claims. However, Winters rights are mentioned
elsewhere in the record where sharing shortages is discussed. Understanding whether Navajo Winters claims were quantified with the NIIP
legislation requires a close look at that part of the record.

SHARING SHORTAGES
A shortage-sharing provision first appears in NIIP's negotiation
history in 1957. Sometime that year, the parties to the negotiations agreed
to share shortages on the river in times of drought.7 8 The Tribal Council
75. The Jicarilla Apache Indian Reservation touches the Navajo River, a tributary to the
San Juan. Under Winters, the tribe has claims. They are at issue in two pending cases, New
Mexico v. United States, Civ. No. 75-184, and JicarillaApache Tribe v. United States, No. CIV-821327-C (D.N.M., filed Nov. 12, 1982). See also Whiteing, supra note 29. Water claims of the
numerous Rio Grande Pueblos are complex. See Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 662; C.
DuMars et al., Pueblo Indian Water Rights (1984).
76. See Wilkinson, supra note 47, at 24.
77. See M. Cohen, Legal Research 164 (1985).
78. The Tribal Council first agreed to the draft bill on NIIP and San Juan-Chama, which
included the shortage-sharing provision, in December 1957. See Council Resolution CD-8657, supranote 40. As early as May of that year, the proposed projects did not include a shortage-sharing provision. See H. Doc. No. 424, supranote 18, at 271-87.
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meeting at which the draft NIIP bill, which included a shortage-sharing
provision, was approved involved considerable discussion of the provision.79 Attorney Larry Davis led the discussion. He urged the Council to
agree to the section for two reasons. One was that Congress would never
pass a bill without the provision. The other was that the Tribe was interested in attracting industries to the basin in order to build an economic
base for that part of the reservation. Industries would have no incentive to
locate in the San Juan Basin if their priorities to needed water were junior-and water claimants subsequent in time to NIIP and San Juan-Chama
would have late priorities. Thus the Tribe agreed to share shortages in the
river, and in so doing, relinquished its prior claim under Winters to San
Juan waters. Davis said, significantly, "Industrial development..,
"80 is just
as important to the Navajo people as irrigation, maybe more so.
The first Senate report on the first NIIP bill reported out of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs explained the shortage-sharing
provision. According to that report, it "provides adequate protection for
irrigation requirements for the Navajo area and at the same time provides
a method of cooperation in water uses for downstream mineral and industrial developments on Navajo land." 81
The original Senate bill also authorized (as did subsequent bills)82
the building of capacity in the 'Main Canal,' which carried water from
storage behind Navajo Dam to the eastern edge of the project lands, for
municipal and industrial water uses "over and above the diversion
requirements for irrigation." 83 At the first hearing, in 1958, in the first few
minutes of his testimony, Tribal Council Chair Paul Jones stated that
allowing enough capacity in the irrigation project works to permit delivery of water for M&I purposes "is almost as important to the Navajo people as the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project itself." 84 He went on to say that
the additional water "will make feasible large-scale industrial development in northwestern New Mexico which, we hope, in conjunction with
the irrigation project and private and tribal projects elsewhere on the
Navaho Reservation,
will permanently solve the Navaho unemployment
85
problem."
In debate on the floor of the House on May 22, 1962, Rep. Joseph
Montoya of New Mexico, sponsor of a NIIP bill, described the project's

79. See supra note 44.
80. Minutes of Dec. 11, 1957, supra note 41, at 68-69.
81. S.Rep. No. 2198,85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968).
82. See citations supra note 42.
83. Senate Hearing 1958, supranote 18, at 4.
84. Id. at 99. See also Senate Hearing 1959, supra note 18, at 33; House Hearing 1960, supra
note 42, at 65-66; Senate Hearing 1961, supranote 18, at 36.
85. Senate Hearing 1958, supra note 18, at 99. Under recent custom, "Navajo" is the
accepted spelling of the tribe's name. Some sources predating the 1960s use the "Navaho"
spelling. In quotations from those sources, the original spelling is preserved.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol, 32

features, including the shortage-sharing provision and the authorized
canal capacity for M&I purposes. He then went on to say:
The Navajo Tribe has agreed to this manner of developing and using the water [of the San Juan] by relinquishing its rights under the so-called Winters doctrine
for the water necessary to irrigate the Navajo Indian
irrigation project in order to provide a feasible and
workable plan for the comprehensive development of
both the land and industrial
resources of the San Juan
86
Basin of New Mexico.
This statement repeats nearly verbatim Navajo testimony at the
1960 and 1961 hearings. Paul Jones in 1960 said before the House Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation that
[tihe Navajo Tribe has consented to [share shortages],
and relinquished its rights under the Winters doctrine
for the water necessary to irrigate the Navajo Indian
irrigation project, in order to provide a practicable plan
for comprehensive development of the resources and
industrial potential of the San Juan Basin. We have
taken87this step because it is necessary for our survival.
Testimony by Maurice McCabe, Tribal Council Executive Secretary, before the Senate Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation and
the corresponding House Subcommittee in 1961 involved precisely the
88
same language.
Is the shortage-sharing provision really quantification of Navajo
rights? And, if the shortage-sharing provision is quantification, what
amount is quantified? By relying on the statutory language relevant to
Winters claims and pushing the meaning of that language to its logical
ends, given the record, one must answer that the Navajo claims were
indeed quantified at the NIIP allocation. 89 This is the logical implication of
86. 108 Cong. Rec. H8876 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Montoya).
87. House Hearing 1960, supranote 42, at 64.
88. Senate Hearing 1961, supranote 18, at 36; House Hearing 1961, supra note 15, at 33.
89. Other answers are possible but are not discussed fully here. One is that, given NIIP Act
Section 12(a), the shortage-sharing provision does quantify Navajo claims, but at New Mexico's entitlement. This interpretation agrees with much of the criticism of the answer
addressed fully in the text, but goes on to say that New Mexico allocations of San Juan water
to nonndians prior to NIIP are invalid and should be overturned. An analysis of this issue is
beyond the scope of this article. Another alternative, the most far-reaching of all, is that the
shortage-sharing provision did not quantify Navajo claims because the whole river is
Navajo, another issue beyond the scope of this article. This interpretation also requires a decision about the validity of Section 12(a)'s limit on meeting Indian claims with NIIP and San
Juan-Chama project works.
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the rationale for the provision, combined with section 12(a) and the physical and legal availability of water in the river.
According to New Mexico estimates, approximately 112,000 acrefeet of water per year was available, or not yet committed, out of New
Mexico's compact entitlement for M&I uses when NIIP was under discussion.90 The tribe hoped that industry would locate in the basin and use
that water. But rights to that water, under New Mexico law, would have
junior priorities. In most years, the Navajo prior claim to NIIP water
would cut into deliveries to junior users; in some years, full delivery to
NIP would preclude any delivery to junior users. Uncertainty such as this
was an effective deterrent to industry locating in the basin, so the tribe
believed it necessary to give up its prior claim to NIIP water and to agree
to share shortages ratably in the basin. The implication for quantification
of this rationale for sharing shortages is this: for the 112,000 acre-feet to
have a junior claim, it could not, by definition, be Indian water with a Winters priority. Thus the Navajo must have assumed that the M&I water was
not theirs. Section 12(a) limits all Indian claims to New Mexico's allocation, and there was no reference to other water within the allocation that
the tribe might use in the future. 91 Thus by the logic of the rationale for it,
the tribe's agreement to share shortages limited its claim to the NIIP allocation.
However, this is not a satisfactory conclusion for several reasons.
For the shortage-sharing provision to amount to quantification, it is necessary to refer widely to state law and external facts about water allocation
and supply in New Mexico. Such an excursion seems to go beyond the reference to legislative history that strict construction allows to find congressional intent. And the tortuous journey through the legislative record
90. In 1958, New Mexico State Engineer Reynolds estimated New Mexico's entitlement
under the compacts at 838,000 acre-feet per year. Of that, 237,000 acre-feet were committed
to current and authorized uses. NIIP and San Juan-Chama would use an additional 362,000
acre-feet. That left 238,000 acre-feet "available for future developments." Senate Hearing
1958, supra note 18, at 86. By 1959, the State Engineer had added 39,000 acre-feet to present

and authorized uses, leaving 200,000 acre-feet a year available for future developments. Of
this, 112,500 acre-feet were allocated for municipal and industrial water use. The Animas-La
Plata Project in New Mexico was to take 33,000 acre-feet. All this left about 20,000 acre-feet
for unnamed uses. Senate Hearing 1959, supra note 18, at 19. The State Engineer used the
same figures in testimony before the House the following year. House Hearing 1960, supra
note 42, at 78. See also Senate Hearing 1961, supranote 18, at 49. Reynolds's figure of 838,000
acre-feet was, as it is now known, over optimistic, making estimates of future uses, industrial
or otherwise, fantasy. But at the time that NIIP was under discussion, few people had admitted that the flow of the Colorado was lower than expected in 1922.
91. The only water discussed for potential Navajo benefit, other than NIIP water, was this
M&I water. The 1958 Senate Report spoke of "mineral and industrial developments on
Navajo land," S. Rep. No. 2198, supra note 81, at 86. Paul Jones spoke of solving the Navajo
unemployment problem permanently with large-scale industrial development in New Mexico. Senate Hearing 1958, supranote 18, at 99. Other uses were earmarked by New Mexico for
nonIndian uses. See House Hearing 1960, supra note 42, at 78; Senate Hearing 1961, supranote
18, at 49.
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required for the shortage-sharing provision to mean quantification almost
necessarily contradicts the standard of clarity and plainness. If the record
is read nonetheless to exhibit congressional intent to quantify Navajo Winters rights, that intent would be implied, and then only obscurely
implied.9 2 Also, the set of facts required for sharing shortages to equal
quantification-indeed, the entire environment surrounding the Navajo
decision to share shortages-was the work of the state of New Mexico.
The junior priority for industrial users was created by the State Engineer,
following the law of New Mexico. The late Stephen Reynolds said in a
1988 interview that the shortage-sharing provision was Paul Jones's idea.
Jones "saw the need for M&I development," Reynolds said, "to really create jobs and an economy." 93 According to Reynolds, the late priority date
on a water claim filed by El Paso Natural Gas for a coal gasification project
on the reservation in the late 1950s spurred Jones to propose the sharing of
shortages.94 But Reynolds himself assigned the late priority to the claimadmittedly, according to New Mexico state law. But in an important sense,
Reynolds himself was the author of Jones's worry. Further, it is unclear
why Larry Davis told the Tribal Council that Congress would probably
not pass the NIIP bill without a shortage-sharing provision. The implication is that important interests other than the Navajo favored equalizing
priorities on the river. Rio Grande interests, for example, would benefit
from Navajo relinquishment of first priority. This spin on the history of the
shortage-sharing provision turns it very much into a situation in which
the Navajo were told that they had to limit their water claims to NIIP
because additional water, beyond NIIP, was not theirs. But this situation
begs the question of Navajo quantification, saying that it happened
95
because there was no other water for the tribe.
Thus the conclusion that the shortage-sharing provision quantifies Navajo Winters rights stumbles against two obstacles: 1) the wide reference to state law and surrounding facts and circumstances required to
reach the conclusion; and 2) New Mexico's control of that law and those
facts and circumstances: Several other obstacles stand in the way of the
conclusion that any provision of NIIP's authorizing legislation quantified
Navajo Winters rights: 1) Congress did not, as required by Dion, appreciate
the conflict between existing Navajo rights and quantification; 2) Congress
92. It is possible to reach the conclusion of implied intent using strict construction. "Courts
applying a rule of strict construction will proceed to interpret the statute, often resorting to
extrinsic interpretational aids, to determine whether the legislature intended to reach the
right or power. Thus a court guided by the rule of strict construction may find an implied legislative intent." Wilkinson &Volkman, supranote 52, at 646-47.
93. Interview with S. Reynolds, State Engineer of New Mexico, in Santa Fe, New Mexico
(June 18, 1988).
94. Id.
95. In fact, it is arguable that any uses of water on the San Juan other than NIIP (and San
Juan-Chama, to which the tribe clearly consented) were illegal usurpations of Navajo rights.
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could not have formed the intent to quantify Winters rights in 1962; 3) the
NIIP record is peppered with statements of concern that Navajo rights be
protected; 4) great ambiguity exists over the size of the Navajo water
claim, quantified or not; 5) in 1970 an important congressional player in
NIIP's authorization publicly appeared to doubt that NIIP had limited
Navajo water rights for all time; and 6) recognized settlements of Indian
Winters claims achieve quantification with unambiguous, straightforward
language, contrasting sharply with the language available in the NIIP
record. Each of these issues is discussed in the following section.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST QUANTIFICATION
Under the rule articulated in Dion, for Congress to abrogate a
treaty right, it must have "actually considered the conflict between its
intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty."9 6 But from a close
reading of the legislative record, it is not clear that Congress had any
notion of what Winters claims were, much less that by authorizing NIIP it
would, in fact, be canceling a significant portion of the tribe's Winters
claims.
For example, the state of New Mexico put together an important
document in the early 1950s setting out options and equities involved in
the development of the San Juan River. In that document, New Mexico
states that it "has never acceded to BIA and tribal interpretations of the socalled Winters case."9 7 However, what exactly New Mexico perceived the
BIA and tribal interpretation to be is not specified. "The State's position is
that the rights of the Indians, whatever they may be, have not been determined and cannot be determined except by due process of law. It [was] the
view of the State, however, that this situation need not hinder or impede
the orderly development of the water resources of the San Juan River in
this state." 98 Indeed, the entire issue of 'Indian Rights' receives 11 lines in
this report, a treatment following nearly nine pages on state and federal
law, the compacts, and international law considered "applicable" to the
San Juan issue. 99 Reynolds claimed in 1988 that the state hardly took
potential Navajo Winters claims into account in the course of negotiating
over NIIP: "We didn't feel we had to defend against Winters doctrine
rights," he said. 10 0
96. 476 U.S. at 739-40.
97. State Engineer of New Mexico, A review of the San Juan Problem in New Mexico 14
(1953).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 5-14.

100. Interview with S. Reynolds, supranote 93.
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Throughout the hearing record, non-Navajo witnesses and legislators continually referred to the "so-called Winters doctrine."1 0 1 This
referral is indicative of their doubt about the viability of the Winters doctrine. In his testimony, Felix Sparks did not even call the case by name; he
referred only to "various federal theories." 102 In one exchange, between
Wayne Aspinall and fellow committee member James Haley of Florida,
there is a vague reference to the idea that with NIIP, the Navajo were both
giving something up and gaining something. Haley was questioning William Utton, Vice President of the San Juan, New Mexico, County Farm and
Livestock Bureau, who was speaking in opposition to the Chama Diversion. For reasons that are not clear-Utton was not identified as an expert
on Indian water law-Haley suddenly asked Utton if NIIP would "take
away from the Navajo Indians any water rights that they now have?" 103
Utton's response was confusing, 104 and Aspinall interjected, presumably
to clarify the confusion. What he said is the only hint in the entire record
that anyone appreciated the simultaneous relinquishment and attainment
of rights that quantification of Winters claims involves. While his remarks
are a poor substitute for real understanding, they are worth quoting in
full:
The Navajo Tribe would be unable to use any more
water than it is using at the present time if it were not
for the fact that we have this proposed development
for this area. The Navajo Dam has been built, and the
reservoir will fill. The Navajos would have had no
right to the use of this water, if we did not have this
agreement; and they come in here and state at the
present time that they are satisfied.... They are getting
some value for the value they forego. As far as any
water rights that they had which are undetermined,
they have made their agreement that they are willing
to go along with the water that this calls for the development of their lands.1 5
Aspinall does not state clearly what the value is that the Navajo
will forego, and he contradicts the notion that the tribe had any preexisting rights to water. What is clear from Aspinall's remarks, however, is the
hard political compromise involved in NIIP, a compromise in which the
101. See, e.g., 108 Cong. Rec. H8876, supra note 86; House Hearing 1961, supra note 15, at 37.
102. House Hearing 1961, supra note 15.

103. Id.at 56.
104. Utton said that under literal interpretation of certain treaties, "they [the Navajo] have
all the rights to the water," but that NIIP "would not take away from any water that they are
presently using," at the same time that "a portion" of the Navajo's rights would in fact be

taken away. Id. at 56-57.
105. Id.at 57.
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scale and scope of rights that the Navajo brought to the table was vastly
under-appreciated.
Thus it is far from clear that the most informed members of Congress on NIIP had the slightest idea of the nature of Navajo Winters rights,
specifically that limiting Winters claims to the NIIP allocation involved the
sacrifice of a significant portion of the tribe's total claim. How, if this is
true, is it possible for Congress to have formed the intent, clearly and
plainly expressed or otherwise, to quantify Navajo Winters claims? It
seems impossible for Congress to have appreciated the conflict between
the full scope of Navajo rights and the smaller claim granted by NIIP, as
called for in Dion.
Another point goes to the issue of the formation of congressional
intent. Congress authorized NIIP in 1962, the year before the Supreme
Court established a standard for quantifying Indian Winters claims with
Arizona v. California.Prior to Arizona v. California,legally protected Indian
water rights consisted only within the context of priority; there was no
basis for estimates of the size of claims. Indeed, the language of the record
is limited almost entirely to talk of priority Whatever the logical implications of relinquishment of priority, given surrounding water law and
other sections of the NIIP act, Congress could not have had quantification
of Navajo Winters claims in its collective mind when the only firm right
that existed before 1962 was priority.
Another point from the record vitiates the argument for quantification. That is that in various places throughout the record, concern is
expressed that Navajo rights, including water rights, be protected. James
Haley of Florida, member of the Subcommittee, was systematically introduced and referred to as "a friend of Indians." 106 Regularly throughout
the hearing record, he expressed concern that Navajo rights were being
infringed, either through the San Juan-Chama Diversion, or through
NIIP. 1 7 In 1961, Haley questioned Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall
about NIIP.
Mr. Secretary I want to ask you this direct question: In
the construction and operation of this project, is the
Navajo Tribe of Indians going to be deprived of any
water rights that they now have or will this project in
any way interfere with the development
of lands
108
belonging to the Navajo Tribe?

106.
behalf
at 30.
107.
108.

See, e.g., Wayne Aspinall's statement that "there has been no better public servant in
of the Indians than the gentleman from Florida." House Hearing 1960, supra note 42,
See, e.g., House Hearing 1960, supra note 42, at 29-30 (statement of Rep. Haley).
House Hearing 1961, supranote 15, at 92 (question of Rep. Haley).
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fact, the
Stewart Udall replied that indeed it would not and, in
109
project would "allow them to use and establish a water right."
Udall had previously expressed concern to the Senate Subcommittee over the provision that became section 12(a); when the language
first appeared in 1961, Udall wrote to Senator Clinton Anderson, Chair of
both the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and of the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, about the section that became
12(a). Udall said that if it were merely intended to reaffirm Article VII of
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact-which charges to the state in
which the use occurs any water use by the United States or its wards,
including Indians-the language should be made identical to that article
or deleted. 110 On the other hand, Udall wrote, "If it does something more,
rights of the Indians to the water, its inclusion in
or limits or restricts the
111
the bill is improper."
Udall eventually agreed to retention of the language that became
12(a) "in light of the clarifying language" contained in the Senate Report
of 1961.112 That language can only be a short paragraph on the section
stating that it "prohibits the Secretary of the Interior from servicing any
preferential water right of the United States or Indian tribe through the
facilities created by this act." 113 On its face, because it lacks the additional
language found in section 12(a) of the authorizing legislation relating to
compact entitlements for New Mexico and Arizona, this language means
that water for NIIP could not be the satisfaction of a Navajo Winters claim.
The logical implication is that NIIP was not intended to quantify Navajo
Winters rights. Of course, section 12(a) of the NIIP legislation is worded to
keep the satisfaction of Indian claims within compact allocations. The
point is that the Secretary of the Interior appears to have believed that
important Indian rights were not being compromised with NIIP. Language protecting Indian rights must be construed broadly; the many
expressions of concern for those rights in the record argue against congressional intent to limit Navajo rights through quantification.
Another point undermines the notion that the NIIP legislation
quantified Navajo Winters rights for all time. That is the ambiguity over
just how much water the tribe was granted by the legislation. The statute
speaks clearly of an annual 508,000 acre-foot diversion.114 The later hear109. Id. (statement of S. Udall, Secretary of the Interior).

110. S. Rep. No. 83,87th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1961) (statement of S. Udall, Secretary of the
Interior). See also Upper Basin Compact art. VII, supra note 62.
111. S. Rep. No. 83, supra note 104, at 10 (statement of S. Udall, Secretary of the Interior).
112. See H.R. No. 685, supra note 66, at 20 (statement of S. Udall, Secretary of the Interior).
113. S.Rep. No. 83, supra note 110, at 3.
114. NIIP Act, supra note 1, §2. See also DuMars & Ingram, supra note 3, at 27-28, 34-35
(providing a discussion of the meaning of the legislation's choice of diversion rather than
depletion).

Fall 1992]

THE NAVAJO INDIAN IRRIGATION PROJECT

115
ing record mentions an annual consumptive use of 252,000 acre-feet.
Another figure emerged when the Bureau of Reclamation, in the course of
building the project, decided for economic reasons to shift from the originally planned gravity-flow irrigation to sprinkler irrigation. This decision
reduced the diversion required to achieve the same amount of consumptive use to 330,000 acre-feet a year.116 Thus there has been confusion over
whether the Navajo have rights to the 508,000 acre-foot diversion mentioned in the legislation, the 252,000 acre-feet of consumptive use required
to complete the project, or the new 330,000 acre-foot diversion required
under sprinkler irrigation to achieve consumptive use of 252,000 acrefeet.117 Conflicting Interior Department Solicitor General opinions exist
on the issue.1 18 Could it be that the NIP legislation quantified the Navajo
Winters right without specifying a quantity? It seems unlikely.
Two other points, drawn from outside NIIP's legislative record,
contradict the notion that Congress quantified Navajo Winters rights in the
course of discussing and authorizing NIIP Congressman Wayne Aspinall
of Colorado chaired the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
while NIIP was under discussion. The House committee did not report
that a NIIP bill was out until 1961. This was due to Aspinall's concern that
the project, along with the Chama Diversion, would jeopardize his
favored project, the Animas-La Plata project. Thus he was the chief congressional force behind section 12(a), delaying NIIP's passage until the bill
included it.119 He repeatedly asked witnesses before the House Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation if the Navajo were limiting their
requests for water to what they got with NIIR Indeed, the portions of the
record that support most strongly the argument that NIIP represents
quantification of Navajo Winters rights were created by Aspinall. So if it is
possible to say that Congress intended to quantify Navajo Winters rights
with NIIP, Aspinall would be the author of that intent.
Yet, in hearings conducted in 1970 on the issue of amending the
NIIP act to change the precise boundaries of the project and to increase the
appropriation ceiling, Aspinall spent considerable time asking then Tribal
Chair Raymond Nakai if the Navajo were limiting their Winters claims to
NIIP. He asked Nakai,
115. See Senate Hearing 1959, supra note 18, at 19; Senate Hearing 1961, supranote 18, at 49.
See discussion in BIA testimony of larger consumptive-use figure, supranote 18.
116. See Bureau of Reclamation, Dep't of the Interior, Navajo Indian Irrigation Project,
New Mexico, All-Sprinkler Irrigation System 2 (1974).
117. Id. There is even the possibility of another consumptive use figure of 238,000 acrefeet, with sprinklers. The differing figures are explained further in Jacobsen, supranote 30, at
171-72.
118. See id. at 171-77 (further explaining the differing Solicitor General's opinions).
119. See M. Lawson, The Navajo Indian IrrigationProject: Muddied Past, Clouded Future, 9
Indian Historian 19 (1976).
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Are you folks going to be satisfied with the allocation
of water that has been decided by the compacts... [ojr
are you going to be, later-on, [sic] relying upon the socalled Winters doctrine which would presumably Rain
you.., more if you carried it to the fullest extent? 0
When Nakai demurred, saying that he was "not a water expert,"
Aspinall pressed more forcefully. He said that he was "just a little bit hesitant about giving.., support to a project that means so much to you...
you might take water from the State of Colorado or the State of
[when] ...
Utah or the State of Wyoming." 12 1 He went on to say,
I don't think you can get any more [water] out of New
Mexico. You might be able to, I don't know. But in the
State of Wyoming, where the water is not yet put to use
and has not been committed, if your tribe wishes to
proceed under the doctrine set forth
122 in that Winters
case, we are in for a lot of trouble.
Nakai eventually, under pressure, said that the tribe would "take
the water that we can use for the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project. " 123 But
this statement appears to be designed more to stem the press of questions
from Aspinall than to commit the tribe to quantification. And while Nakai
says that the tribe will 'take' water for NIIP, he significantly omits saying
that it will take no other. In any case, the exchange shows that Aspinall
had serious doubts that NIIP limited Navajo Winters when, given his
the legislative proceedings, he was in the best possible
prominent role in124
position to know.
The second point drawn from outside NIIP's legislative record
that weakens the argument for quantification is the clarity of the language
on quantification in the recognized negotiated settlements of Indian Winters claims. Of the handful of recognized, legislative settlements of Indian
Winters rights as of 1991, none has been achieved by language as vague on
the point of quantification as the NIIP legislation or its legislative history.
In all five cases, the statutory language exhibits clear congressional intent
to settle or quantify Indian water rights. The title of each act mentions
either water rights, water rights claims, or water rights settlement; 125 settlement of the Indian claims at issue is also mentioned elsewhere in the
120. House Hearing 1970, supra note 73, at 37 (exchange between Rep. Aspinall of Colorado and R. Nakai, Chair of the Navajo Tribal Council).
121. Id. at 38.
122. Id,
123. Id.
124. Aspinall's uncertainty is all the more remarkable considering the exchange with Reynolds in that same year discussed supra note 73.
125. See supra note 24 (citing the titles of the acts in full). It is interesting to note that in
1984, Barry Goldwater said of the 1978 Ak-Chin settlement act that it "represents the first legislative settlement of an Indian tribe's water rights." 138 Cong. Rec. S11836 (statement of Sen.
Goldwater).
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acts; 12 6 four of the five statutes name-an amount of water to be received by
the tribes annually. 127 In the Animas-La Plata legislation, the award to the
tribes is specified in the negotiated agreement incorporated into the statute; 128 and four of the five statutes contain explicit language by which the
tribes involved waive all other claims to water.129 Each settlement is
explicitly the central purpose of the legislation. It is not necessary to scour
the legislative history for clues to whether Congress intended to quantify
Indian water claims. It is not necessary, either, as it is with the NIIP case, to
spin out the logical implications of certain provisions of the statutes
involved and refer to external facts and conditions.

CONCLUSION
The only section in NIIP's authorizing legislation that mentions
Indian water rights, section 12(a), prohibits the use of NIIP dams and
ditches to satisfy an Indian claim in excess of New Mexico's entitlements
to water under the 1922 and 1948 Compacts. The legislative record on that
provision reveals that its purpose was to protect Colorado's compact entitlements, particularly for the Animas-La Plata Project. It does not on its
face limit Indian, or Navajo, claims to the NIIP allocation. It cannot be said
to have quantified Navajo Winters rights to the NIIP allocation.
Two statements in the hearing record on NIIP made by representatives of New Mexico offer the clearest evidence that NIIP was to have
involved quantification of Navajo Winters rights. Both mention limitation
of Indian claims. But they conflict on the size of the Indian claim involved
and are not clear on exactly which Indians are included in the limitation.
Furthermore, they are expressions of state interests, traditionally antagonistic to Indian interests, against which the federal government has traditionally protected Indians.
The agreement by the Navajo to share shortages on the San
Juan-made in 1957, embodied in the 1962 legislation and in every bill
126. See supranote 24. The relevant section for the Ak-Chin settlement is §1(b)(5); for the
Papago, §301(4); for the Pima-Maricopa, §2(b); for the Utes, §2; and for the Mission Indians,
§103(b).

127. For the Ak-Chin, the amount is 85,000 acre-feet (§3 of the 1984 statute); for the Papago,
a total of 28,200 acre-feet (§§303(a)(1)(A), 303(a)(2)(A), and 305(a)); for the Pima-Maricopa,
32,000 acre-feet (§2(a)(9)); and for the Mission Indians, 16,000 acre-feet (§106(a)(1)).
128. The text of the agreement can be found at H. Rep. No. 932, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3165 (1988). Amounts allocated to the Ute Mountain and Southern Ute tribes are found on pp.
34-50.
129. The relevant sections are, for the Ak-Chin settlement, §1(b)(5); for the Papago,
§307(a)(1)(D) [the Papago settlement also provides that any waiver will not take effect until
the financial support called for in the statute is in place, §§307(d) and (e)]; for the Pima-Maricopa, §10(b)(1); and for the Utes, §8(a). Nothing in the Mission Indians settlement mentions
waiver explicitly.
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introduced between 1958 and 1962, referred to throughout the legislative
record as a compromise of Navajo rights, and made to promote economic
development in the San Juan Basin-is the strongest candidate for language quantifying Navajo Winters rights. But it can logically mean quantification only by reference to wide-ranging circumstances and facts
created by New Mexico or under that state's control. Almost by definition,
the need to refer so widely to external facts makes it impossible for the
provision to represent the clear and plain intent of Congress.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Congress could have
formed the intent to quantify Navajo Winters rights when it authorized
NIIP in 1962. First, the record lacks language suggesting that Congress
considered Winters rights valid-continual references to the "so-called
Winters doctrine" convey the doubt with which Winters was viewed. And
second, Congress lacked a firm basis for calculating the size of Winters
claims, because NIIP's passage predated the decision in Arizona v. California that created the foundation for quantification.
Expressions of concern found throughout the record that Navajo
rights be respected; ambiguity about the precise amount of water
involved; uncertainty eight years after NIIP's authorization that quantification had occurred-expressed by Wayne Aspinall, author of most of the
statements in the record suggesting a limitation on Navajo water rights;
and the contrasting clarity of language found in the five widely-recognized Winters settlements are the final arguments standing in the way of
the conclusion that Navajo Winters rights were limited for all time to the
amount to be used for NIlP.
The story of Navajo Winters claims and whether authorization of
the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project quantified those claims for all time is
a complex one. But it is worth sorting through that complexity, because of
the scale of Navajo claims and their significance in New Mexico's San Juan
Basin. 130 Without some certainty about how much of the San Juan is
Navajo, future use of the San Juan cannot occur without producing even
130. It is clear from the record that whatever occurred during consideration of NI, it only
involved Navajo claims to the San Juan in New Mexico. In the House hearing in 1961, Aspinall
asked Executive Secretary McCabe whether the tribe's relinquishment of Winters priority
extended "to the whole San Juan Basin as well as just to that part of the San Juan Basin in New
Mexico?" House Hearing 1961, supranote 15, at 37. McCabe declined to answer until he could
consult with people involved in the negotiations, but sent a letter to Aspinall for the record. It
states, "In reaching an agreement with the State of New Mexico and other members of the
Upper Colorado River compact, the Navajo Tribe qualified its position in respect to legal
rights which the tribe enjoys under the doctrine of Winters v. United States, assuring to it certain paramount rights in respect to waters of the San Juan, among others, in order to accomplish a practical and equitable division of water among all parties concerned. This concession
was only agreed to by the tribe in consideration of getting the Navajo irrigation project established in New Mexico .... It is clearly understood by all interested parties, I believe, that the
tribe's concession in respect to the Winters doctrine applies to no other situation than this
one." Id. at 46. McCabe also stated that "the Navajo Tribe will not consider itself bound by this
agreement unless the irrigation project is in fact established." Id.
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greater complexity Without proper recognition of Navajo rights to the San
Juan, the largest tribe in the United States will be deprived of perhaps its
most valuable resource. This analysis has shown that it is an error simply
to conclude that NUP quantified Navajo Winters claims. Obstacles derived
from the principles of the trust responsibility and the canons of construction stand in the way of that conclusion. Indeed, the spirit of the trust
responsibility suggests that the record on NIIP should be interpreted to
conclude that the Navajo did not quantify their Winters rights with NIIP.
More precise conclusions than that are not warranted by the ambiguous
and often confusing record.

